Can teaching social dilemmas make people more prosocial? An experiment

Economics and business students regularly behave less prosocially than others. Can ethics training reverse this tendency? Results from a repeated public goods experiment reveal that it can. Students who attend an interactive lecture on social dilemmas show significantly more cooperation than others. However, the lecture does not appear to increase the incidence of reciprocal behavior. As many current social problems qualify as social dilemmas, this result stresses the importance of ethics training for policy makers and curriculum designers alike in overcoming the incentive structure of social dilemmas.     

试论强化我国地理标志的法律保护——以法国香槟酒行业委员会与商标评审委员会商标争议纠纷为引

随着经济的发展,人们越来越重视地理标志在市场竞争中的作用。各国均在法律层面对地理标志予以保护,并采用不同的立法模式。我国表现为结合运用《商标法》和《地理标志产品保护规定》来保护地理标志。但从实践来看,此种方式尚存在缺陷。在最新修订的《商标法》中也没有提出将地理标志区分于其他标志而给予针对性的规定。为了进一步发挥其在国际竞争中的经济价值,我国应当给予地理标志更大力度的保护。     

Analysing the provision of agricultural public goods: The case of irrigated olive groves in Southern Spain

Analysis of the joint production of private and public goods (PGs) by farming activities is a fertile research field. These joint production processes are typically characterised by a high level of complexity derived from the intense relationship between the production of both kinds of outputs. An integrated approach is strongly recommended for the study of the provision of agricultural PGs and the design of public intervention in this sector. Here, we propose a theoretical framework to apply an integrated approach using the analytic network process (ANP) to analyse the production of PGs by agricultural systems to support public decision-making concerning the design and implementation of agricultural policies. We introduce a novel approach in applying ANP along both directions of the influences among elements, allowing us to identify the most influenced PGs and the farmers’ most influential decisions. This methodological approach is empirically applied to a particular farming system: the irrigated olive groves (IOG) of Southern Spain. Results show that the PGs most influenced by olive growers’ decisions are soil fertility, the visual quality of agricultural landscapes and farmland biodiversity. In addition, the most influential factors affecting the provision of PGs are the structural ones, namely farm size and tree density, and, to a lesser extent, management factors dealing with fertilisation, soil and irrigation management. These results are useful for supporting agricultural policy decision-making to enhance adequate management of this farming system regarding PGs production.     

Collective self-governance in a marine community: expedition cruise tourism at Svalbard

Collective self-governance is gaining attention in the literature for maintaining the quality of key attractions and promoting sustainable tourism. The long-term success of collective self-governance is dependent on both its internal organization and its embeddedness in external state and non-state regulations. This paper presents the marine community concept, consisting of a policy and a user community, as a framework for investigating the internal and external dynamics of collective self-governance and its ability to steer toward sustainable cruise tourism. As methodology, a case study design was chosen which was primarily studied by means of interviews with a spectrum of relevant actors concerning expedition cruise tourism at Svalbard. By applying the marine community to Svalbard expedition cruise tourism governance, we draw the following conclusions: (1) collective self-governance complements governmental regulation through access to knowledge, conflict resolution and rule-compliance based on disclosure, traceability and trust; (2) collective self-governance's increasing role in the policy community alienates the expedition crew from the user community; and (3) informational overflow by co-existence of collective self-governance and state-governance challenges sustainable cruise tourism. Collective self-governance would, therefore, benefit from reflection, especially regarding the role of the user community that functions as an intermediary between state and self-governance regulations.     

REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.     

Technology gap,imported capital goods and productivity of manufacturing plants in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper uses firm-level data from Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya to examine the effect of capital goods imports on domestic firms' productivity, and the role firms' technology gap plays in aiding the transmission of knowledge embodied in capital goods to domestic firms. The results show that increasing imports of capital goods and closing technology gaps have positive effects on productivity. Furthermore, domestic firms with technology standards farther from international best practices benefit more from capital goods imports. The results also imply that trade liberalization policy aimed at eliminating tariffs on capital goods will significantly improve the performance of technically incompetent firms in the African manufacturing sector.     

Sustaining cooperation in social dilemmas: Comparison of centralized punishment institutions

This study investigates two centralized punishment institutions for a linear public goods game. These institutions require a certain contribution level and sanction under-contributing players. The two differ in who, among those who do not meet this requirement, receive sanctions. In one institution, all violators are sanctioned, and in the other, only the worst violator(s) is sanctioned. Theoretically, the public goods game of the latter institution yields contributions equal to or greater than that of the former institution with the same requirement and sanction level. The results of an experiment support this theoretical prediction. However, there is a discrepancy between the theory and laboratory observations in that the institution with the theoretically optimal requirement did not yield the highest profit.     

Price Effects on Compound Commodities

We examine the effect of simultaneous price changes on the total demand for a group of goods, which we call a compound commodity. Specifically, we consider unit and proportional cost components (e.g., taxes, transportation costs) imposed on compound commodities. If the unit cost is positive, then the proportional cost raises the relative price of the more expensive good, and thus induces substitution towards the less expensive good within this group. Then, the substitution effect of the proportional cost for a compound commodity is non‐negative if and only if the compound commodity and the other goods are, on average, not strongly substitutable.     

Institutions and Work Incentives in Collective Farming in Maoist China

This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that assumes widespread shirking and inefficiency in agricultural production under the collective system in Maoist China, and attributes these problems to egalitarianism in labour remuneration and difficulties in labour supervision. Drawing on interviews with 131 former production team members from 16 provinces, this paper re‐examines the issue of work incentives by placing it in a historical and social context in which formal institutions, such as the different forms of collective organization, income distribution and state extraction, as well as informal institutions, such as indigenous social networks, communal norms and collective sanction, interacted with non‐institutional factors, especially local geographical, demographic and ecological conditions, to constrain and motivate Chinese villagers participating in collective production. The complexity and fluidity of this context gave rise to a multiplicity of patterns of peasant behaviour in team farming, which accounts for the contrasting performances of rural collectives in different areas and periods.